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645 
DYING TO SLEEP: USING FEDERAL 
LEGISLATION AND TORT LAW TO CURE 
THE EFFECTS OF FATIGUE IN MEDICAL 
RESIDENCY PROGRAMS 
Andrew W. Gefell* 
Sawyer: Dr. Nossett, I’m going to start with you. You’ve not only 
seen it all, you say you’ve done it. And in fact, you once fell 
asleep yourself while delivering a baby? 
Nossett: That’s correct.1 
INTRODUCTION 
The exhausting work schedules of resident physicians in the 
United States create an array of grave safety problems for 
medical residents and the public at large. In addition to residents’ 
personal and emotional difficulties and the compromised quality 
of health care, the incidence of motor vehicle accidents that occur 
after residents leave work is alarming.2 
                                                          
 * Brooklyn Law School Class of 2004; B.A., Brandeis University, 1997. 
The author would like to thank his parents, Paul and Peg Gefell, Johnita, 
Johanna, Nora and Mary Jo for their unconditional support and 
encouragement. 
1 Interview by Diane Sawyer with Dr. Angela Nossett, Chief Resident, 
Harbor UCLA Medical Center (ABC television broadcast, June 18, 2002). 
2 See Lisa M. Bellini et al., Variation of Mood and Empathy During 
Internship, 287 JAMA 3143 (2002) (finding that “enthusiasm at the beginning 
of the internship gave way to depression, anger and fatigue”). In addition, a 
recent study found that the rate of accidents involving anesthesia residents was 
more than twice the national average. See R.T. Gear et al., Incidence of 
Automobile Accidents Involving Anesthesia Residents After On-Call Duty 
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To combat this crisis and other problems related to resident 
work hours, New York created the Bell Regulations, which limit 
the number of hours residents may be scheduled.3 In addition, on 
November 6, 2001, Congressman John Conyers of Michigan 
introduced the Patient and Physician Safety and Protection Act of 
2001 (PPSPA) as an amendment to Title XVII of the Social 
Security Act.4 The bill, still far from gaining sufficient support to 
                                                          
Cycles, 87 ANESTHESIOLOGY 938 (1997). Of note is the fact that the research 
was limited to accidents occurring after on-call shifts. According to a 1991 
mail survey, residents typically work continuously with little or no sleep for an 
average of 56.9 total hours twice a week. See Public Citizens Health Research 
Group et al., Petition to OSHA (April 30, 2001), available at 
http://www.citizen.org/publications/release.cfm?ID=6771. This number is 
above and beyond their other assigned shifts, which can cumulate up to as 
many as 136 out of the 168 hours in a week. See L. Lagnado, Hospitals 
Overwork Young Doctors in New York, WALL ST. J., May 19, 1998, at B5. 
3 10 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 405.4(b)(6)(ii) (2002). 
These regulations were created in response to uproar from the Libby Zion case 
in New York City. See infra, note 29 (discussing the Libby Zion case). The 
New York State Health Commissioner put together a panel, led by Dr. 
Bertrand Bell, Professor at Albert Einstein College of Medicine, to investigate 
conditions in New York’s teaching hospitals. See Leslie K. Kohman, “Beat the 
Clock”: Will There be Time in the New Millenium to Train Surgeons and Care 
for Patients, CardioThoracic Surgery Network, (June 4, 2002), available at 
http://www.ctsnet.org/doc/5821. Hence, the panel became known as the Bell 
Commission. Id. In 1989, the recommendations of the commission became 
part of the New York State Health Code. Id. See also H.R. 1852, 210th Leg. 
(N.J. 2002). On June 20, 2002, the New Jersey Assembly unanimously voted 
to pass a bill limiting residents’ work hours. Press Release, Committee of 
Interns and Residents, NJ Assembly Passes Bill to Limit Resident Work 
Hours, available at www.cirdocs.org/news/217 breakingnewspage.htm (last 
visited May 20, 2003); see also H.R. 390 (P.R. 2002). 
4 H.R. 3236 IH, 107th Cong. (2001). Amongst its findings, the bill states 
that scientific literature demonstrates that the excessive work hours of resident 
physicians produce harmful effects on both patient care and the health of 
resident physicians. Id. Furthermore, the bill points out that residents work an 
“excessive number [ ] of hours,” which is “inherently dangerous for patient 
care and the lives of physicians,” that “sleep deprivation of the magnitude 
seen in residency training programs leads to cognitive impairment,” and that 
scientific research demonstrates that the “excessive hours worked by resident-
physicians lead to higher rates of medical error, motor vehicle accidents, 
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be passed into law, is based in large part on the New York 
regulations.5 Both state regulations and federal legislative action 
support the view that employers need to better control the 
scheduling of their employees to prevent foreseeable risks to 
others.6 If New York serves as a guide, however, regulations 
may not be sufficient. The New York regulations have proven to 
have limited effectiveness, as hospitals routinely violate work 
                                                          
depression and pregnancy complications.” Id. 
5 See 10 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS, tit. 10, § 405.4(b)(6)(ii) (2002). 
The PPSPA is consistent with the recognition that industries affecting public 
safety warrant federal regulation. For example, transportation industries are 
subjected to strict federal limits on the number of hours airplane pilots, truck 
drivers, train conductors and seamen are permitted to work. 14 C.F.R. § 
121.471 (2003) (limiting flight times for all flight crewmembers); 49 C.F.R. § 
395.3 (2003) (setting maximum driving times for motor vehicle carriers); 49 
C.F.R. §§ 228.21 (2003) (imposing civil penalties for violating hours of 
service regulations for railroad employees), 49 C.F.R. § 228.23 (2003) 
(imposing criminal penalties for falsifying reports or records of hours of 
service for railroad employees); 46 U.S.C. § 8104 (2003) (setting work hour 
regulations for seamen). In 1999, the European Union agreed to limit the 
length of the work week for residents to forty-eight hours. Paul R. McGinn, 
Europe Will Limit Resident Hours, MED. STUDENT JAMA (Sept. 20, 1999), 
available at http://www.amaassn.org/scipubs/msjama/articles/vol_282/no_13/ 
europe.htm; David Villar Patton et al., Legal Considerations of Sleep 
Deprivation Among Resident Physcians, 34 J. HEALTH L. 377 (2001). The 
authors found that in Israel, a system of longer residency programs with fewer 
hours during the residency “substantially enables Israel’s doctors to permit 
room for their own human needs, and in turn, provide compassionate and 
humane care as a matter of habit.” Id. at 386, citing Jesse Lachter, Looking at 
the Training of House Staff, 319 NEW ENG. J. MED. 718, 719 (1988). 
Additionally, they report that New Zealand residents may work up to only 
sixteen hours consecutively, with a weekly maximum limited to seventy-two 
hours. Id. Emergency room residents may work no more than ten consecutive 
hours, with up to fifty hours per week. Id. Finally, Denmark, Norway and 
Sweden residents work thirty-seven to forty-five hours per week; in the 
Netherlands they are limited to forty-eight hours per week. Id. at 387. 
6 See Gene P. Bowen, Wherein Lies the Duty? Determining Employer 
Liability for the Actions of Fatigued Employees Commuting From Work, 42 
WAYNE L. REV. 2091, 2092 (1996) (stating that the “notion behind such 
legislation appears to be recognition of an employer’s duty to monitor the 
work schedules of its employees to avoid creating a safety hazard to others”). 
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hour standards.7 
In addition to formal regulations, the deterrent effect of the 
tort system might also be utilized to “encourage” hospitals to 
adjust residents’ training and employment.8 Specifically, in the 
realm of third-party liability, a person struck by a sleep-deprived 
resident that has fallen asleep at the wheel on the way home from 
work may be able to sue the hospital on a theory of negligence. 
Although this specific claim has never been successfully tried, 
analogous case law and public policy suggest such a claim is 
legally sound and could, if triumphant, improve resident training 
methods and working conditions in the United States. But, 
ultimately, the question remains whether that is the best 
alternative. 
Part I of this note reviews the ever-expanding landscape of 
scientific evidence on fatigue and its effect on human capabilities, 
patient care and the lives of residents. Part II introduces the 
elements of the New York statute, evaluates its effectiveness and 
briefly examines the proposed federal legislation. Part III 
explores whether utilizing the deterrent force of the tort system is 
a wise alternative or supplement to regulatory attempts to change 
residency working conditions. While acknowledging that the 
majority of courts reject imposing third-party liability on the 
employer, this section focuses on three analogous cases that 
support liability under certain circumstances. Furthermore, Part 
III utilizes workers’ compensation cases in a similar fashion. Part 
IV synthesizes direct negligence and workers’ compensation case 
law and argues that, within these cases, principles emerge that 
support a finding of negligence in the resident-employee context. 
                                                          
7 See, e.g., New York State Department of Health, State Health 
Department Cites 54 Teaching Hospitals for Resident Working Hour Violations 
(June 26, 2002), [hereinafter Health Department Cites 54 Teaching Hospitals] 
available at http://www.health.state.ny.us/nysdoh/commish/2002/resident_ 
working_hours.htm. 
8 See Boston Medical Center, et al., 330 N.L.R.B. 152 (1999) (holding 
that medical residents are employees within the meaning of Section 2(3) of the 
National Labor Relations Act, notwithstanding that they also possess aspects 
of students). 
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Part V recognizes that third-party tort liability offers compelling 
benefits, but concludes that enforced public regulation of resident 
work hours proposes far less frightening costs and maintains the 
benefits of well-rested physicians. 
I. FATIGUE: WHAT IT IS AND WHAT IT DOES 
Two commonly cited consequences of medical resident 
fatigue are reduced quality of patient care and a negative impact 
on the health of residents.9 In addition, motor vehicle crashes, 
particularly after on-duty shifts, have also garnered attention in 
discussion of residents’ work hours.10 To understand the reasons, 
it is important to first understand the nature of fatigue. 
Human beings have a biological need to sleep, and sleep 
deprivation causes the brain to signal to the body the need to 
sleep.11 Sleepiness is a specific term “relating to reduced 
alertness as a result of increased pressure to fall asleep.”12 
Whether lacking sleep for twenty-four consecutive hours (“sleep 
loss”), or receiving inadequate sleep over a period of time 
                                                          
9 Included in Congress’ findings in support of this bill were that residents 
work “an excessive number [ ] of hours” that is “inherently dangerous for 
patients and the lives of [ ] physicians,” that “sleep deprivation of the 
magnitude seen in residency training programs leads to cognitive impairment” 
and that scientific research demonstrates that the “excessive hours worked by 
resident-physicians lead to higher rates of medical error, motor vehicle 
accidents, depression and pregnancy complications.” H.R. 3236, supra note 4, 
at § 2. 
10 See, e.g., R.T. Gear et al., supra note 2, at 3A; James M. Lyznicki, et 
al., Sleepiness, Driving, and Motor Vehicle Crashes, 279 JAMA 23 (1998); 
Carole L. Marcus & Gerald M. Loughlin, Effect of Sleep Deprivation on 
Driving Safety in Housestaff, 19 SLEEP 763 (1996). 
11 See Lyznicki et al., supra note 10, at 1908. “The sleep process 
involves a demand or obligatory component related to an individual’s prior 
amounts of rest and work, and a circadian component related to 2 intervals of 
increased sleepiness and lowered performance are experienced during each 24-
hour period.” Id. 
12 Id. at 1909. “Sleepiness is a normal manifestation of the biological 
need for sleep, just as hunger signals the need to eat and thirst to drink.” Id. 
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(“chronic partial sleep restriction”), the harmful impact on 
cognitive performance is similar.13 Fatigue is a feeling of 
physical and mental weariness resulting from exhaustion.14 A 
lack of adequate sleep, therefore, inevitably causes fatigue. 
The implications are frightening in light of the highly 
complex duties of resident physicians, as the necessary skills of 
job performance inevitably suffer. Studies prove that motor skills 
such as the manual dexterity of surgical residents are vulnerable 
to the effects of fatigue.15 One study of emergency residents 
demonstrated “reductions in the comprehensiveness of history 
and physical examination documentation” and a decline in 
completion time for clinical task and accuracy tests.16 Beyond the 
psychomotor skills required for the job, the long hours of 
                                                          
13 Sigrid Veasey et al., Sleep Loss and Fatigue in Residency Training, 
288 JAMA 1116 (2002). The authors report that “performance testing of 
vigilance (responsiveness to simple repeated tasks) and serial mathematical 
calculations were equally affected by 24 hours of total sleep loss and 1 week 
of sleep restriction to 5 hours per night.” Id. at 1116-17. The studies discussed 
revealed that “cognitive performance [ ] of healthy young adults who were 
sleep deprived . . . [are] below the mean.” Id. at 1117. Furthermore, verbal 
processing and complex problem solving abilities were impaired, as evidenced 
by the finding that, “[l]earning for both complex cognitive and procedural 
tasks can decrease by up to 50% when sleep loss occurs. . . .” Id. In a study 
observing the training experience of junior and senior residents, 
“[p]erformances on simulated electrocardiogram, short term recall of a list of 
things to do, and reaction times all deteriorated after being on call; these 
postcall performance deficits were similar for junior and senior residents, 
suggesting a lack of adaptation over time to the sleep-deprived state.” Id. The 
authors also pointed out, however, that these types of studies must be 
controlled for factors that affect sleepiness such as the intake of caffeine and 
other stimulants, warm ambient temperature, reduced body temperature and 
recent food intake. Id. 
14 See AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 665 (3d ed. 1992). See also 
Lyznicki et al., supra note 10, at 1909 (defining fatigue as “a more complex 
phenomenon that may be defined as the decreased capability of doing physical 
or mental work, or the subjective state in which one can no longer perform a 
task effectively”). 
15 Veasey et al., supra note 13, at 1117. 
16 Id. 
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residency training have also been found to cause depression, 
anxiety and anger.17 Finally, and perhaps most significantly, as 
the long hours of residency training compound the effects of 
fatigue, residents consistently lose vigor and empathetic concern 
for patients.18 
The increased incidence of motor vehicle crashes after work, 
especially after on-call shifts, additionally manifest from fatigue 
in resident physicians.19 One study compared sleep deprivation 
                                                          
17 See, e.g., Bellini et al., supra note 2, at 3143. 
18 Id.; see also Amer Ardati, Don’t Overwork Physicians, Imperil Public, 
DETROIT NEWS, Feb. 13, 2002 (quoting a resident physician in a Columbia 
Presbyterian case study as stating, “if you’re on two nights in a row, you want 
to do as little as possible. You give bad care.”); Bellini et al., supra note 2, at 
3146 (commenting that “results . . . at the end of [the one year] internship 
demonstrated a significant increase in personal distress coupled with a 
decrease in empathetic concern”); Public Citizen, ACGME’s Proposed Limits 
on Resident Physician Work Hours are Inadequate, Coalition Says (Feb. 11, 
2002), available at http://www.citizen.org/pressroom/release.cfm?ID=1021 
(quoting Dr. Ruth Potee, national president of CIR/SEIU and a third-year 
family practice resident at Boston Medical Center, who said, “The 
consequences of working excessive hours is serious, both to our patients and 
to ourselves. Auto accidents, complications of pregnancy, depression—all 
disproportionately impact resident physicians. . .”). 
19 See Veasey, supra note 13 at 1122 (finding that “the greatest 
documented danger of sleep loss for medical residents is the risk of motor 
vehicle crashes”); Carol Ann Campbell, Hospital Residents Plead for More 
Rest–Two Lawmakers Hear the Tales of Fatigue, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, 
N.J.), May 8, 2002, at 39 (quoting a resident at University of Medicine and 
Dentistry of New Jersey, who mentioned “[o]ne of our residents fell asleep in 
the parking lot and didn’t wake up until the morning.”); Sanjay Gupta, Is Your 
Doctor Too Drowsy?, TIME, Mar. 11, 2002 at 17 (quoting a surgeon stating 
that “[p]ractically every surgical resident I know has fallen asleep at the wheel 
driving home from work . . . I know of three who have hit parked cars. 
Another hit a ‘Jersey barrier’ on the New Jersey Turnpike, going 65 m.p.h.”); 
Ivan Oransky, Post-call Fatigue Poses Risk for Residents, MED. STUDENT 
JAMA, May 24, 1999, available at http://www.ama-
assn.org/scipubs/msjama/ articles/vol_281/no_21/post.htm (stating that 
“[n]early every resident I know has either fallen asleep behind the wheel 
driving home after call or knows someone involved in a post-call crash”). See 
also AAA FOUND. FOR TRAFFIC SAFETY, WHY DO PEOPLE HAVE DROWSY 
DRIVING CRASHES? INPUT FROM DRIVERS WHO JUST DID (1999). Especially 
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among on-call housestaff and faculty members, including its 
effect on driving.20 Forty-four percent of housestaff had fallen 
asleep at the wheel when stopped at a red light, versus twelve 
percent of the faculty.21 Twenty-three percent of housestaff fell 
asleep at the wheel while driving, versus eight percent for the 
faculty.22 Overall, a total of forty-nine percent of housestaff had 
fallen asleep at the wheel, with ninety percent of these incidents 
occurring after an on-call shift.23 Similarly, the accident rate of 
anesthesiology residents surveyed in another study was more than 
twice the national average.24 The solution seems simple. Because 
fatigue is a state of sleep deprivation, “[t]he most effective 
countermeasure . . . is sleep.”25 Limitations placed on resident 
work hours provide the opportunity to catch up on sleep, 
presumably leading to less fatigue and, therefore, improved 
patient care and resident health and safety. 
                                                          
relevant to the residency discussion are the conclusions that work and sleep 
schedules are associated with car crashes, drivers in “sleep-crashes” are more 
likely to involve an atypical schedule, and that “working the night shift 
increases the odds of a sleep related (versus non-sleep-related) crash by nearly 
6 times.” Id. at 50. 
20 Marcus & Loughlin, supra note 10. The study utilized an anonymous 
questionnaire mailed to pediatric residents and full-time faculty. Id. at 763. 
The questionnaire included general questions about being on call, participating 
in other types of nocturnal work, falling asleep while driving, traffic citations 
and motor vehicle accidents. Id. All incidents relating to falling asleep at the 
wheel occurred after on-call shifts. Id. The authors provided that “the study 
has the limitations of a retrospective questionnaire study . . . and it is possible 
that [housestaff] provided biased responses.” Id. 
21 Id. at 764. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 Gear et al., supra note 2. “Thirty-six-item questionnaires were mailed 
to anesthesia residents in training at the Hospital of the University of 
Pennsylvania . . . ask[ing] subjects to report on their own traffic accidents, 
near accidents, or traffic violations occurring during their residency which 
they attributed to post-call fatigue.” Id. 
25 Veasey et al., supra note 13, at 1122. 
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II. THE PUBLIC REGULATION PATH 
Convinced that the hazardous effects of sleep loss and fatigue 
for medical residents is a serious problem for patients and 
residents, New York decided to regulate the work hours of 
residents in its teaching hospitals.26 However, states throughout 
the country have been slow to follow.27 Nonetheless, the problem 
calls for attention, as evidenced by the current proposal to 
nationalize the substance of the New York regulations in the form 
of federal legislation.28 
A. New York State’s Bell Regulations 
The New York State Bell Regulations were largely motivated 
by the Libby Zion case in which sleep loss and fatigue were 
blamed for the alleged negligence of a resident physician.29 A 
grand jury investigation attributed fault to the residency training 
system, as opposed to doctors or the hospital.30 The regulations 
                                                          
26 See supra, note 3 (providing a brief history of the New York 
Regulations). 
27 Id. (noting that only New Jersey and Puerto Rico have proposed such 
regulations). 
28 See supra, note 4 (discussing the PPSPA). 
29 See generally Dan Collins, A Father’s Grief, A Father’s Fight, L.A. 
TIMES, Feb. 1, 1995, at E1. In 1984, Libby Zion was brought to New York 
hospital after suffering from a high fever and earache. Id. She was given a 
dosage of Demerol despite her use of an anti-depressant drug, Nardil. Id. A 
mixture of the two drugs can be fatal, and Libby died within five hours. Id. 
Her father filed a lawsuit against the hospital. Id. The claim included a charge 
that the exhausted resident who prescribed the Demerol was negligent in 
failing to realize that the combination of the two drugs can prove fatal. Id. 
30 See Barbara A. DeBuono, The Medical Resident Workload, MED. 
STUDENT JAMA (Dec. 2, 1998) (quoting the grand jury as stating, “[t]he most 
serious deficiencies can be traced to the practice of permitting inexperienced 
physicians to staff emergency rooms and allowing interns and junior residents 
to practice medicine without supervision.”), available at, http://www.ama-
assn.org/sci-pubs/msjama/vol_280/no_21/jms81019.htm.; see also Daniela 
Lamas, Residency, Round the Clock: New Rules Seek to Ease Training 
Doctors’ Fatigue, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 15, 2002, at E1. 
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are designed to protect resident health and patient care through 
scheduling and resident work hour limits. 
First, the Bell Regulations provide that “the scheduled work 
week shall not exceed an average of eighty hours per week over a 
four week period.”31 While the cumulative hours of a given work 
week may exceed eighty, the four week average must meet the 
criteria.32 The regulations are flexible, therefore, in that they 
reasonably account for patient care needs that require a rigorous 
work week, while maintaining a four week average to allow 
adequate rest. 
Second, “trainees shall not be scheduled to work for more 
than twenty-four consecutive hours.”33 This section addresses the 
detrimental effects that result from sleeplessness but also 
recognizes the hospital’s need to provide round-the-clock patient 
care services to the public. Although twenty-four consecutive 
hours without sleep is arguably dangerous, the regulations at least 
set a clearly defined limit.34 
Third, the regulations provide that on-call duty shall not be 
included in the twenty-four and eighty hour limits, so long as 
“such duty is scheduled for each trainee no more often than every 
third night . . . [and] a continuous assignment that includes night 
shift on-call duty [must be] followed by a non-working period of 
no less than sixteen hours.”35 On-call duty can demand 
extraordinarily long hours of work without sleep.36 The 
                                                          
31 10 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS., tit. 10, § 405.4(b)(6)(ii)(a) (2002). 
32 10 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS., tit. 10, § 405.4(b)(6)(ii)(a) (2002). 
33 10 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS., tit. 10, § 405.4 (b)(6)(ii)(b) 
(2002). 
34 10 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS., tit. 10, § 405.4 (b)(6)(ii)(b) 
(2002). See also Patton et al., supra note 5, at 380 (reporting that “researchers 
have even compared the effects of sleep deprivation to the effects of alcohol 
intoxication”). 
35 10 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS., tit. 10, § 405.4(b)(6)(ii)(d)(2)-(3) 
(2002). 
36 See, e.g., David Abel, Bill Eyes Guidelines on Work Hours for Medical 
Residents, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 10, 2001, at B1 (stating that a former 
resident of Baltimore’s Johns Hopkins Hospital abandoned her surgical 
training after falling asleep during a 60-hour shift without rest); Gupta, supra 
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regulations mandate that hospitals at least spread out on-call 
shifts so residents can consistently obtain a reasonable amount of 
rest while completing their regular weekly schedules. 
These seemingly realistic regulations account for hospitals’ 
staffing needs while limiting the inherent sleep deprivation 
problems of residency training methods. New York hospitals, 
however, continue to schedule residents beyond the prescribed 
limits.37 Although the Bell Regulations focus on reducing fatigue, 
enforcement of the prescribed limits has twice proven the 
regulations somewhat ineffective, both in 1998 and 2002.38 
                                                          
note 19 at 73 (stating that “it [is] not unusual to work 40 hours in a row 
without rest”). 
37 See Health Department Cites 54 Teaching Hospitals, supra note 7. 
These 2002 violations came four years after a first wave of sweeping 
inspection by the Department of Health. New York State Department of 
Health, NYS Hospitals Fined for Violating Resident Work Hours (June 18, 
1998) [hereinafter NYS Hospitals Fined], available at http://www.health. 
state.ny.us/nysdoh/commish/98/workhrs.htm. The department issued a report 
based on a survey of twelve teaching hospitals “showing widespread abuse of 
resident work hour limits, particularly among surgical residents in New York 
City.” Id. The report specifically found that all first year residents in the 
cardiovascular surgical program worked 110-130 hours per week. Id. Ten of 
eighteen surgical residents worked in excess of eighty-five hours per week. Id. 
Finally, residents were found to have worked until 8 p.m. after a thirty-six 
hour shift only to return to work at 6 a.m. the next day. Id. 
38 See id. (reporting the 1998 violations); Health Department Cites 54 
Teaching Hospitals, supra note 7 (reporting the 2002 violations). The 
Department of Health contracted with IPRO, an independent not-for-profit 
corporation, to monitor resident working hours in New York State. IPRO, 
New York State Resident Work Hour Regulations (n.d.). As of May 2003, 
however, the annual report had not been published so it is difficult to assess 
whether IPRO has been more successful. Furthermore, the Accreditation 
Council for Graduate Medical Education (“ACGME”), the body in control of 
determining accreditation of teaching hospitals, announced its own enforceable 
guidelines applicable to residency programs beginning July 3, 2003. 
Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education, Resident Duty Hours 
Language (Feb. 13, 2003), [hereinafter Resident Duty Hours Language] 
available at http://www.acgggme.org/DutyHours/dutyHoursLang_final.asp. 
Also mirroring in large part the New York State Bell Regulations, these 
guidelines seek to self-regulate the teaching hospitals with the enforcement 
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B. The Patient and Physician Safety and Protection Act of 
2001 
The PPSPA essentially mirrors the Bell Regulations in regard 
to specific regulation of residents’ work hours and schedules.39 
Supported by findings drawn from scientific evidence asserting 
that the effects of fatigue manifest in compromised patient care 
and endangered resident health, the legislation appropriately 
recognizes that resident work hours need to be reduced. 
For example, unlike the state regulations, however, the 
federal legislation contains unique enforcement mechanisms. The 
Act conditions receipt of federal funds on compliance with the 
work hour limits.40 Furthermore, the Act provides an incentive to 
                                                          
mechanism of more frequent review of programs. Id. For example, during 
routine accreditation surveys in 1999, the ACGME issued citations for work 
hour violations to 11.7% of programs surveyed. Jay Greene, More 
Residencies Cited for Work Violations, AMNEWS, Mar. 6, 2000, available at 
http://www.ama-assn.org/sci-pubs/amnews/pick_00/prl20306.htm. ACGME 
officials stated that citations had been increasing over the past few years. Id. 
Nevertheless, “[t]o date, the ACGME has not withdrawn accreditation of any 
program solely for overworking residents.” Id. Therefore, while setting limits 
for the number of hours residents are allowed to work in accreditated hospitals 
recognizes the problem, lack of enforcement will have trouble solving it. In 
comparison, the New York State Department of Health attempts, as an 
external regulator, to implement a rational work environment for residency 
training programs. If the shortcomings demonstrated in the 1998 and 2002 
reports are any indication of the problem of enforcement, truly internal 
enforcement by the ACGME is limited as well if enforcement has no teeth. 
But see Jaya Agrawal, Resident Education and Safety, 66 AM. FAM. 
PHYSICIAN 1569 (2002) (reporting that the Yale surgical residency program is 
at risk of losing accreditation unless changes are made with respect to the 
number of hours residents work). 
39 See generally H.R. 3236, supra note 2. Similarities include the eighty-
hour work week, twenty-four consecutive hour limit and required time off 
between shifts. Compare 10 N.Y. COMP CODES R & REGS., tit. 10, § 
405.4(b)(6)(ii) with H.R. 3236, § 3 (j)(1)(A). 
40 H.R. 3236, supra note 2, at § 3 (j)(1)(A). This distinction is found in 
an enforcement mechanism: “ . . . [A]s a condition of participation under this 
title each hospital shall establish the following limits on working hours.” Id. 
Thus far, assigning standards to the guarantee of federal funds as a 
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hospitals that successfully conform to the new standards within 
five years.41 
Like the Bell Regulations, which generated public attention 
by highlighting the conditions of residency programs, federal 
legislation could spark national awareness of the issues 
concerning residents—especially because it is likely that 
everyone, at some point in their lives, will rely on a resident 
physician in a time of need.42 The national community responding 
to the concerns of fatigue, coupled with the past success of 
tailoring federal funds to government standards and the financial 
incentive offered for compliance, indicates that the PPSPA takes 
what New York has attempted to achieve a step further. 
While violations of the New York regulations are well 
documented, not all hospitals, or departments or specialties 
within hospitals, fail to comply.43 Therefore, even though certain 
                                                          
conditioning device has proven successful. Dori Page Antonetti, A Dose of 
Their Own Medicine: Why the Federal Government Must Ensure Healthy 
Working Conditions for Medical Residents and How Reform Should be 
Accomplished, 51 CATH. UNIV. L. REV. 875, 913 (2002). The Balanced 
Budget Act of 1997 imposed residency program guidelines for federal funding 
on teaching hospitals in order to better serve public health. Id. By attaching 
conditions to federal grants, thus providing a powerful incentive for hospitals 
to follow such guidelines, the legislation proved successful in that all of the 
goals of the initiative were met. Id. 
41 H.R. 3236, supra note 2, at § 4 (providing funds). 
42 In fact, according to the results of the 2002 Sleep in America poll, 
conducted by the National Sleep Foundation, the respondents indicated, on 
average, the maximum amount of time a doctor should work is 9.8 hours per 
day. NATIONAL SLEEP FOUNDATION, 2002 “SLEEP IN AMERICA” POLL (2002). 
Eighty-six percent also stated that if they knew their doctor was working for 
twenty-four consecutive hours, they would feel anxious about their safety, and 
seventy percent would ask for another doctor. Id at 26. Similar results 
reflected concern involving drowsy airplane pilots, and workplace overtime 
generally. Id. at 27-28; see also, Antonetti, supra note 40, at 909 (observing 
that “[n]ewspapers, documentaries, and popular television programs have shed 
light on the problem of excessive work hours during residency . . . expos[ing] 
a system previously hidden from the public eye, and . . . spark[ing] criticism 
and outrage”). 
43 See, e.g., Anne Barnard & Liz Kowalczyk, Medical Resident Workload 
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hospitals may not maintain a perfect record, they have made 
strides in reducing residents’ workloads.44 Still, public regulation 
as a solution to problems resulting from the excessive work 
schedules of resident physicans is far from perfect, as 
demonstrated by the ability of hospitals to function while 
absorbing the costs of fines.45 The PPPSA appropriates amounts 
to cover the “incremental costs incurred in order to comply with 
the requirements imposed by [the] Act.”46 Therefore, federal 
regulation that invests in the system it seeks to regulate is a step 
in the right direction. 
                                                          
Curbed, Big Impact Seen on Hub Hospitals, BOSTON GLOBE, June 13, 2002, 
at A1. Brigham and Women’s Hospital has cut back the hours in their surgery 
program to eighty to eighty-five hours. Id. Dr. Michael Zinner, Chief of 
Surgery, planned to require doctors to sacrifice research time to help cover 
shifts, hire more physicians’ assistants and provide additional training to 
nurses. Id. Brighman and Women’s and Yale-New Haven Medical Center 
estimated that changing their surgery programs could cost $1 million a year. 
Id.; see also Jay Greene, Residencies Successful in Curbing Work-Hour 
Violations, AMNEWS (July 30, 2001), available at http://ama-assn.org/sci-
pubs/amnews/pick_01/prsc0730.htm. 
44 The regulations force hospitals to reduce resident physicians’ 
workloads and assume financial burdens. For example, Jackson Memorial 
Hospital in Miami has dealt with the eighty hour week for more than six 
years, since residents unionized and bargained for change. See Lamas, supra 
note 30. While residents are not barred from working beyond the eighty 
hours, the hospital did hire “physician extenders,” laboratory technicians, 
nurse practitioners and physician assistants. Id. This additional personnel may 
help to “fill the gaps,” but it is noteworthy that the annual overtime budget ran 
out after four months. Id.; see also Jackie Jadrnak, Residents Defend 
Schedule, ALBUQUERQUE JOURNAL, July 8, 2002, at C1. Steve McKernan, 
CEO of the University of New Mexico Hospital, in responding to cutting 
resident work hours, “It’s going to be more expensive. We’ve routinely been 
adding advance-practice nurses.” Id. However, hiring more advance-practice 
nurses comes at almost twice the cost. Id. But see Agrawal, supra note 38. 
45 See Health Department Cites 54 Teaching Hospitals, supra note 7; 
NYS Hospitals Fined, supra note 37. 
46 H.R. 3236, supra note 2, at § 4. Compare Antonetti, supra note 40 
(stating that in authorizing financial assistance, “the federal government may 
provide teaching programs with total funds up to $1 trillion in 2003, $800 
million in 2005, $400 million in 2006, and $200 million in 2007”). 
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III. TORT LIABILITY FOR HOSPITALS AS AN ALTERNATIVE 
DETERRENT 
Regardless of good intentions, the enforcement problems in 
New York require creative thinking to accomplish the task of 
reducing resident work hours in the name of improved health 
care and healthier residents. When a fatigued resident commits a 
medical error that causes injury, a negligence claim arises and an 
explanation of why the negligence occurred is inconsequential. 
Therefore, while fatigue may increase the number of medical 
errors, the issue may be moot in the context of medical 
malpractice. When a resident falls asleep at the wheel after an 
exhausting shift, however, analogous case law illustrates that 
actual fatigue and its cause become a central theme in litigation. 
A. Robertson v. LeMaster 
In Robertson v. LeMaster, the Supreme Court of West 
Virginia found a railroad company liable for damages from an 
accident caused by an employee who fell asleep driving home 
from work.47 After laboring for more than twenty-six hours at a 
train derailment site, the employee, LeMaster, finally insisted 
that he was too tired to continue working.48 The employer 
suggested that if he would not work, he should go home.49 
Another railroad employee drove LeMaster to his car—LeMaster 
fell asleep with a lit cigarette in his hand during the ride.50 On his 
way home he fell asleep at the wheel, resulting in an accident 
with Robertson.51 
In his claim against the railroad, Robertson argued that the 
company “knew or should have known that its employee 
                                                          
47 301 S.E. 2d 563, 565 (W. Va. 1983). 
48 Robertson v. LeMaster, 301 S.E. 2d 563, 565 (W. Va. 1983). 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
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constituted a menace to the health and safety of the public.”52 The 
railroad contended it had no duty, as a matter of law, to control 
an employee acting outside the scope of employment.53 In the 
alternative, it argued that any negligence on its part was not the 
proximate cause of the injuries sustained, and the employee’s 
negligence was an independent intervening cause that cut the 
string of causation.54 
On the issue of duty, the Robertson court recognized that 
under traditional principles of tort law, an employer has no duty 
to control employees outside the scope of employment.55 
Nevertheless, the court asserted that the issue was not whether 
the employee was to be controlled, but, rather, “whether the 
[railroad’s] conduct prior to the accident created a foreseeable 
risk of harm.”56 According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 
an affirmative act may give rise to a duty to use reasonable care 
if such an act creates an unreasonable risk of harm to another.57 
Here, requiring an employee to work unreasonably long hours, 
driving him to his vehicle and sending him on the highway in an 
exhausted condition satisfied the requirement for such an act.58 In 
addition, the court considered “the likelihood of injury, the 
magnitude of the burden in guarding against it, and the 
consequences of placing that burden on the defendant.”59 The 
court held that a reasonable jury could find that the employee, 
after working excessive hours, was in such an exhausted 
condition that driving caused a foreseeable and unreasonable risk 
of harm to motorists.60 In the view of the Supreme Court of West 
Virginia, the duty analysis is primarily driven by foreseeability. 
                                                          
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 Robertson v. LeMaster, 301 S.E. 2d 563, 565 (W. Va. 1983). 
55 Id. at 567. 
56 Id. 
57 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 321 (1965), cited in Robertson, 
301 S.E.2d at 567. 
58 Robertson, 301 S.E.2d at 568-69. 
59 Id. at 568. 
60 Robertson v. LeMaster, 301 S.E. 2d 563, 570 (W. Va. 1983). 
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The court also rejected the railroad’s argument that the 
employee-driver’s negligence constituted an intervening cause 
that broke the chain of causation as a matter of law.61 Robertson 
argued that LeMaster’s negligent driving was caused by fatigue 
directly attributable to the employer’s negligence in imposing 
unreasonable work hours.62 The plaintiff argued that the 
employer’s negligence “reduced the capability of its employee to 
think and act as a reasonable person.”63 Further, the plaintiff 
argued that if the intervening cause can be reasonably anticipated, 
liability may be imposed on the defendant because “the risk 
created by the defendant may include the intervention of the 
foreseeable negligence of others.”64 
Foreseeability of harm, as with duty, played a critical role in 
the court’s analysis of causation, and the plaintiff won the day.65 
The employee arguably broke the chain of causation through his 
own negligence—that is, by deciding to drive while fatigued. 
Despite this fact, the court found it reasonable to attribute this 
seemingly independent decision to the negligence of the employer 
in requiring an unreasonable work schedule.66 Since the alleged 
negligence of the employee did not “constitute a new effective 
cause and operate independently,” such an intervening cause 
could not “relieve a person charged with negligence in 
connection with an injury.”67 Moreover, since the intervening 
cause could be anticipated after such unreasonable hours, the 
court held that the jury could conclude “LeMaster’s negligent 
conduct was a direct result of the mental fatigue and physical 
                                                          
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. (quoting W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS (4th ed. 1971)). 
65 Robertson v. LeMaster, 301 S.E. 2d 563, 570 (W. Va. 1983). (stating 
that if “[t]he Defendant railway’s negligence reduced the capability of its 
employee to think and act as a reasonable person . . . LeMaster’s conduct 
would not constitute an intervening cause so as to relieve the railway company 
of liability”). 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 569 (quoting, Lester v. Rose, 130 S.E.2d 80 (1963)). 
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exhaustion attributable to the [employer’s] negligence.”68 
Therefore, the employer’s creation of a poor judgment maker, 
the employee, outweighed any negligence on the part of 
LeMaster himself.69 
In the context of overworked medical residents, a hospital is 
likely to argue that the resident knew of his or her fatigue and 
weakened ability to drive safely, yet made the decision to drive 
home.70 At that moment, the employee becomes a causal actor 
and, arguably, the cause of the accident.71 Applying Robertson’s 
reasoning, however, by scheduling unreasonable hours and 
causing sleep deprivation, the hospital creates an environment in 
which the ability of a resident to make sound judgments is 
significantly damaged.72 As such, although the resident makes a 
                                                          
68 Robertson, 301 S.E.2d at 570. 
69 The court reversed and remanded with instructions that reasonable 
persons may draw different conclusions from the evidence and facts of the 
record regarding responsibility for plaintiff’s injuries. Id. Presumably, after 
the directed verdict of the lower court in favor of the employer was reversed, 
thus opening the door to potential liability, the case settled. Id. Therefore, 
although the court did not expressly hold that the railroad was negligent in 
working its employees for an excessive number of hours, its willingness to 
give a theory of negligence with third-party liability to the jury revealed that it 
considered the cause of action legally sound. Indeed, the court opined that “if 
the intervening cause is one which is to be reasonably anticipated, the 
defendant may be liable, for ‘[t]he risk created by the defendant may include 
the intervention of the foreseeable negligence of others.” Id. (quoting W. 
PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS (4th ed.) (1971)). Thus, in the employer-
employee context, it appears that the employer may commit acts sufficient to 
create legal causation. Id. Resident physicians become exhausted and fall 
asleep at the wheel often because of excessive work hours. See Lyznicki et al., 
supra note 10. Therefore, assigning long hours as a condition of employment 
would seemingly swallow any negligence on the part of the resident-driver. 
70 See Robertson, 301 S.E. 2d at 569. In Robertson, the court articulated 
the employer’s defense that it was not the proximate cause of the car accident 
occurring during the commute from work. Id. “The thrust of the [employer’s] 
argument . . . is that the negligence of [the employee] constituted an 
independent intervening cause of the accident that broke the chain of 
causation.” Id. 
71 Robertson v. LeMaster, 301 S.E. 2d 563, 569 (W. Va. 1983). 
72 See Patton et al., supra note 5, at 380 (observing “[s]ome researchers 
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conscious, albeit distorted, decision to drive home despite feeling 
exhausted, a strong causal relationship exists between the 
creation of sleep deprivation through excessive scheduling and 
falling asleep at the wheel.73 
B. Faverty v. McDonald’s 
An appellate court in Oregon similarly analyzed third-party 
liability of an employer for injuries resulting from an automobile 
accident involving an employee who had worked long hours.74 In 
Faverty v. McDonald’s, the employee, a high-school student, 
worked at one of McDonald’s fast food restaurants.75 He worked 
his usual shift, 3:30 p.m. to 7 p.m.76 He also worked a cleanup 
shift from midnight until 5 a.m. and continued to work yet 
another shift from 5 a.m. until 8:21 a.m., at which point he 
asked to leave because he felt sleepy.77 Shortly after being 
allowed to leave, the employee began his trip home and either 
became drowsy or fell asleep at the wheel and caused the 
accident.78 The plaintiff, Faverty, was injured and the employee 
died in the accident.79 The plaintiff settled his claims against the 
employee’s representatives and pursued a claim against 
McDonald’s, alleging that McDonald’s was negligent in 
scheduling its employee too many hours without allowing 
adequate time for rest.80 
As in Robertson, the employer’s initial argument focused on 
the absence of duty.81 Specifically, McDonald’s argued it could 
                                                          
have even compared the effects of sleep deprivation to the effects of alcohol 
intoxication”). 
73 Robertson, 301 S.E. 2d at 569. 
74 Faverty v. McDonald’s, 892 P.2d 703 (Or. Ct. App. 1995). 
75 Id. at 705. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
80 Faverty v. McDonald’s, 892 P.2d 703, 705 (Or. Ct. App. 1995). 
81 Id. at 706; Robertson v. LeMaster, 301 S.E. 2d 563, 565 (W. Va. 
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not be held liable as a matter of law because it had no duty to 
prevent an employee from working as many hours as the 
employee in this case did.82 The court disagreed.83 Rather than 
analyzing whether the employee could or should be controlled, 
the court agreed with the plaintiff that liability depends on 
whether the employer created a foreseeable risk to a protected 
interest of the kind of harm that befell the plaintiff.84 The court 
held that, even absent a special relationship, a defendant “is 
subject to a general duty to avoid conduct that unreasonably 
creates a foreseeable risk of harm to a plaintiff.”85 Therefore, the 
court concluded that McDonald’s created a duty because it should 
have foreseen that an employee working three shifts in a twenty-
four hour period posed a risk of harm for motorists when that 
exhausted employee drove home from work.86 
McDonald’s next argued that, even if subject to this general 
duty, there was no evidence that it knew or should have known 
that the employee was so fatigued that it could have foreseen the 
possibility of an accident.87 The court rejected these arguments 
                                                          
1983). 
82 Faverty, 892 P.2d at 706 (noting that the employer relied on Sections 
315 and 317 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts). Section 315 of the 
Restatement provides that “there is no duty to control the conduct of a third 
person as to prevent him from causing physical harm to another unless . . . a 
special relation exists between the actor and the third person which imposes a 
duty upon the actor to control the third person’s conduct.” RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965). Section 317 provides an exception to 
Section 315’s general rule of nonliability for failing to control the conduct of 
third persons by placing the master under a duty to exercise reasonable care if 
the servant is either on the master’s premises or is using the master’s chattel at 
the time of injury. Id. at § 317. Since the accident that caused the injuries did 
not occur on the employer’s premises, and the employee was not at that time 
using the employer’s chattel, the exception provided by Section 317 did not 
apply. Faverty, 892 P.2d at 708. Therefore, the employer argued that the 
general rule of nonliability for the conduct of third persons should apply. Id. 
83 Id. at 706. 
84 Id. at 708. 
85 Faverty v. McDonald’s, 892 P.2d 703, 708 (Or. Ct. App. 1995). 
86 Id. at 710. 
87 Id. at 709. 
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based on the facts.88 Because McDonald’s controlled all of the 
work assignments, the court concluded it knew how often its 
employees were working.89 McDonald’s had a policy against 
working high school students after midnight and, when 
necessary, it did so only once a week.90 A similar company 
policy prohibited employees from working two shifts in one 
day.91 The court found that McDonald’s knew of two recent 
accidents involving employees leaving work late and falling 
asleep at the wheel.92 There was also evidence that the employee 
was visibly fatigued, and the managers on staff that evening 
observed the employee throughout his shift.93 Given these facts, 
the court determined that a reasonable jury could conclude that 
the employer knew or should have known that working its 
employee so many hours would negatively affect his ability to 
drive, and the employer should have foreseen the risk of a car 
accident after its employee worked three shifts in less than 
twenty-four hours.94 
Finally, McDonald’s argued that since the employee 
“volunteered” for the cleanup project, it could not be negligent as 
a matter of law.95 The court was not persuaded.96 The court found 
                                                          
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 Faverty v. McDonald’s, 892 P.2d 703, 709 (Or. Ct. App. 1995).The 
court observed, “According to at least one of [the employer’s] managers, 
those policies were adopted and enforced out of concern that employees not 
become overly tired on the job.” Id. Therefore, the employer’s violation of a 
self-imposed policy factored in to the court’s analysis in siding with the 
plaintiff. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. at 710. 
94 Id. The existence of self-imposed shift limits indicated that the 
employer knew of the risk involved with overworking high school employees. 
Id. at 709 (stating that “according to at least one of [the employer’s] 
managers, those policies were adopted and enforced out of concern that 
employees not become overly tired on the job”). 
95 Id. at 710. 
96 Id. 
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that the employer affirmatively asked the employee to work, 
controlled all work assignments and penalized employees for not 
working as assigned.97 Acknowledging the vulnerable position of 
employees hesitant to fill shifts and complete special duties, such 
as cleanup projects, the court noted that even if the employee 
volunteered the managers knew that assigning this shift to this 
employee would violate company policies.98 In addition, the court 
seized upon the fact that the managers were aware of the 
employee’s condition and compared the managers to “a bartender 
who serve[s] to a visibly intoxicated person who then cause[s] an 
automobile accident that harmed another” after that customer 
“volunteers” to pay for the drink.99 
                                                          
97 Faverty v. McDonald’s, 892 P.2d 703, 710 (Or. Ct. App. 1995). 
98 Id. (stating that plaintiff did not “out of the blue, volunteer to take three 
shifts in one 24-hour period. Defendant affirmatively asked him to work those 
hours.”). 
99 Id. Dram Shop Acts provide an illustrative example. See, e.g., Michael 
L. Young, Note, Reinventing the “Legislative Intent, or Rather the Legislative 
Mandate” on Dram Shop Liability in Missouri: A Look at Kilmer v. Mun, 45 
ST. LOUIS. U. L. J. 625 (2001). At common law, tavern owners “were not 
liable for injuries suffered by the patron or a third party because the proximate 
cause of the injuries was the patron’s consumption of alcoholic beverages, and 
that patron’s negligent driving or other behavior, not the tavern or restaurant 
owner’s sale of the beverages.” Id. at 629. Although the Prohibition Era’s 
Dram Shop Act was repealed at the end of Prohibition in 1934, it remained a 
criminal offense to serve alcoholic beverages to minors or “habitual drunkards 
and the apparently intoxicated.” Id. at 632. By the 1980s, however, in 
response to the terrible problems involved with drunk driving, Missouri, and 
many other jurisdictions abrogated the traditional proximate cause rule. Id. By 
1983, the Missouri Court of Appeals found that “plaintiffs [including third 
parties] could bring a civil action against tavern owners by expanding the duty 
of care dram shop owners owe to the public when selling alcoholic beverages 
to their customers.” Id. at 635. This was justified on the grounds that since an 
intoxicated person is more likely to cause harm than a sober person, “tavern 
owners [have] a duty of care to stop serving alcoholic beverages to intoxicated 
persons.” Id. In 1985, however, Missouri became the only state to pass 
legislation that requires criminal conviction of a tavern owner before civil 
liability can be imposed. Id. at 639. Today, only a few states have no dram 
shop liability at all. Id. The Missouri courts have responded to passage of this 
law with judicially activist interpretation in creating broad areas of liability. 
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Faverty illustrates the fact-sensitive nature of negligence 
cases. The court looked at the circumstances of the case to 
determine that a reasonable jury could find the employer 
negligent.100 It is important to note that the fact that the employer 
in Faverty worked the employee beyond its own rules was crucial 
to the court’s decision.101 Without such a policy and blatant 
violation, the court may not have reached the same result.102 
As significant as Faverty may be, the case provides little 
guidance as to what actually constitutes a reasonable work 
schedule. In concluding that liability was reasonable, the Faverty 
court found a duty arising out of the foreseeable risks of harm 
and consequences of employers’ actions towards their 
employees.103 Therefore, working an employee an unreasonable 
number of hours and thus creating a foreseeable risk of falling 
asleep at the wheel and causing an accident also creates a duty to 
prevent such harm.104 The Faverty court’s failure to provide any 
working guidelines however, renders the opinion open to the 
criticism that its decision was value-driven or merely an 
extraordinary case with abysmal decisionmaking on the part of 
the employer, thus supplying little precedential value.105 
                                                          
See generally id. 
100 Faverty, 892 P.2d at 710. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. at 709-10. Similarly, the existence of a federal regulation does not 
necessarily give rise to negligence per se. Parker v. R & L Carriers, Inc., 560 
S.E.2d 114 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002). In Parker, the employee, a truck driver, 
violated the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations by driving beyond the 
number of hours permitted. Id. The court found that irrelevant to the 
employee’s running a red light. Id. at 115. “The proximate cause of the 
accident was the failure to yield the right of way, not the failure to follow 
federal regulations. [The employee’s] inattention or fatigue may have 
explained his failure to yield the right of way . . . but whether his fatigue 
violated a federal regulation is irrelevant.” Id. 
103 Faverty v. McDonald’s, 892 P.2d 703, 710 (Or. Ct. App. 1995). 
104 Id. 
105 See Lesser v. Nordstrom, Inc., Nos. CIV. A. 96-8121, CIV. A. 97-
6070, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 12607 *13 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 14, 1998) (holding that an 
employee’s twelve-hour shift, as opposed to her normal ten hours, does not 
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create “a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether there was ‘a 
foreseeable risk of harm which the employer had a duty to guard against’”); 
Hershman v. New Line Prods., Inc., No. B145028, 2001 WL 1470360 at *3 
(Cal. App. 2 Dist., Nov. 20, 2001) (stating that “a 19-hour shift and 70 hours 
in the preceding five days was not enough of a factual basis upon which to 
impose liability”). The majority of courts are hesitant to impose third-party 
liability on employers for the tortious acts of employees during the commute. 
See, e.g., McNeil v. Nabors Drilling USA, Inc., 36 S.W.2d 248 (Tex. App. 
2001). In McNeil, the court refused to impose liability on the grounds of an 
absence of a legally recognized duty to third parties. Id. at 251. The employee 
received less than fifteen hours of sleep over the course of four days at the 
employer’s drilling rig site. Id. at 249. On the fourth day, the employee 
decided to drive home to rest, instead of utilizing the on-site sleeping quarters 
provided by the employer. Id. The employee neither complained to 
supervisors about his lack of sleep, nor discussed his plan to rest at home. Id. 
During the drive, after making stops at a store, car wash and another drilling 
rig, he fell asleep at the wheel and crashed into the plaintiff, injuring her. Id. 
The court began its analysis by determining whether an “employer assumes a 
duty over its employee’s off-duty conduct when the employer is aware of the 
employee’s incapacity and affirmatively attempts to control the employee.” Id. 
at 250. Lacking sufficient knowledge of the employee’s state of fatigue, the 
duty question was dismissed. Id. at 251. Furthermore, the court stated that 
employers are not legally required to “monitor their employees before 
allowing them to leave work”, and employers implementing safety policies “to 
prevent employee incapacity do not assume a duty to third parties.” Id.; see 
also D’Amico v. Christie, 518 N.E.2d 896 (N.Y. 1987). In comparing Otis 
Engineering v. Clark, infra pp. 21-24, the court noted that it had not come 
across sufficient facts in which the employer “virtually placed its employee 
behind the wheel.” Id. at 902. Since the employer could not have reasonably 
controlled the employee’s conduct, “plaintiffs [ ] failed to demonstrate any 
legal duty in the existing law of this State that [the employer] can be said to 
have breached.” Id.; Depew v. Crocodile Enterprises, Inc., 73 Cal. Rptr.2d 
673 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998). The employee worked 17.5 hours, then another six 
hours after he had sixteen hours during which he did not have to work. Id. at 
678. During the drive home, the employee caused an automobile accident with 
the plaintiff. Id. The court concluded “there was an insufficient causal nexus 
between [the employee’s] employment and [plaintiff’s] death.” Id.  
 However, the fact-sensitive nature of negligence cases permits liability to 
be imposed under certain circumstances. See Faverty v. McDonald’s, 892 
P.2d 703 (Or. Ct. App. 1995); Otis Engineering v. Clark, 668 S.W.2d 307 
(Tex. App. 1983); Robertson v. LeMaster, 301 S.E.2d 563 (W. Va. 1983). 
Therefore, a plaintiff is well-advised to assert the existence of egregious work 
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Nonetheless, even if the line to draw for an excessive work 
schedule is usually difficult, if not impossible, Faverty 
demonstrates that egregious circumstances can give rise to third-
party liability. 
                                                          
conditions that give rise to fatigue, knowledge of such fatigue on the part of 
the employer and then, pursuant to such knowledge, affirmative conduct in 
releasing or sending the employee out on the road. See Bowen, supra note 6. 
In discussing this duty issue, the difficulty seems to arise at the inability to 
determine the nature of such duty. Id. at 2103. On the one hand, a finding of 
negligence could be grounded upon nonfeasance—“failure to prevent the 
employee from leaving in an incapacitated state”—or, in the alternative, 
misfeasance—“allowing, if not requiring, the employee to work long hours 
and then setting the visibly exhausted employee on the road to drive home.” 
Id. The Robertson and Faverty courts relied upon the latter. Id. at 2104. The 
nonfeasance path severely limits third-party liability by requiring the employer 
to stop the employee from driving home. Moreover, it “ignores the possibility 
that the employer has voluntarily entered an affirmative course of action 
affecting the interests of one of its employees and has thereby assumed a duty 
to act with reasonable care.” Id. at 2105. On the other hand, the concept of 
misfeasance recognizes the causal relationship between the affirmative act of 
imposing a grueling work schedule and the hazard of driving an automobile in 
an exhausted state. “The Robertson court seemed to suggest that the duty arose 
sometime during the excessive work period, while the Faverty court seemed to 
suggest that the duty arose as early as the point of scheduling.” Id. at 2109. In 
synthesizing Faverty, Bower suggests that the court should have been more 
explicit: “The employee’s schedule was excessive, he became visibly 
incapacitated, he asked to go home, and he was released—end of analysis.” Id. 
at 2110. Without such precise instruction, applying these principles to the 
hospital-resident scenario raises similar problems. On the one hand, hospitals 
have for years administered residency programs that are grueling, in which 
residents become incapacitated and leave work to drive home after a long 
shift. See Marcus & Loughlin, supra note 10. Therefore, if the case is one of 
negligent scheduling, the hospital is negligent on a weekly, if not daily, basis. 
On the other hand, if the scheduling is not excessive on its face, and liability 
depends on the existence of an employer’s affirmative act that creates a 
foreseeable danger to others, the release of the visibly incapacitated employee 
constitutes negligence. In that case, employer liability has a stronger case 
because the employer not only caused the incapacitation but also failed to 
guard against it. This is in line with the theory of misfeasance. 
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C. Otis Engineering Corp. v. Clark 
In Otis Engineering Corp. v. Clark, an appellate court in 
Texas adopted the Robertson reasoning and held that an employer 
has a duty to prevent employees under its control from causing a 
foreseeable risk of harm to others.106 In Otis, an employee with a 
history of drinking on the job was visibly intoxicated at work.107 
After he returned from his dinner break, his supervisor suggested 
that he go home and escorted him to his car.108 The supervisor 
asked if he could make it home and the employee replied that he 
could.109 Thirty minutes later, the employee caused an accident 
that killed two women.110 The employee’s blood alcohol level was 
so high that an expert opined that “100% of persons with that 
much alcohol in their systems exhibit signs of intoxication 
observable to the average person.”111 The supervisors were aware 
of his intoxication and that he was in no condition to drive.112 
Furthermore, the employer maintained a nurses’ station for ill or 
disabled employees.113 Nonetheless, the supervisor chose to send 
the employee out on the highway.114 
                                                          
106 668 S.W.2d 307, 311 (Tex. App. 1983). 
107 Otis Engineering Corp. v. Clark, 668 S.W.2d 307, 308 (Tex. App. 
1983). 
108 Id. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. Larry and Clifford Clark brought a wrongful death action against 
the Otis Engineering Corporation after the Clarks’ wives were killed in the 
automobile accident involving one of Otis’ employees. Id. 
111 Id. at 308. 
112 Id. 
113 Otis Engineering Corp. v. Clark, 668 S.W.2d 307, 308-09 (Tex. App. 
1983). 
114 Id. at 308. Clark contended that the affirmative act of the employer of 
sending home an employee known to be intoxicated imposed a duty on the 
employer to act in a nonnegligent manner. Id. at 309. Not only were there 
alternatives, but the affirmative act also subjected other motorists to the 
dangers of an accident on the highway. Id. at 311. The court noted the 
availability of an on-site nurses’ station, and the options of calling a taxi or the 
police, and contacting the family for transportation. Id. Otis asserted that an 
GEFELLMACROXX.DOC 7/7/03 11:27 AM 
 REFORMING MEDICAL RESIDENCY PROGRAMS 671 
 
Echoing Robertson, the court recognized that an employer is 
ordinarily liable only for the off-duty torts of employees 
committed either on the employer’s premises or with the 
employer’s chattels.115 The court opined, however, that all 
persons have a general duty not to engage in any affirmative act 
that may worsen a situation.116 “[P]ersuaded by the logic” of 
Robertson and other decisions that focus the duty inquiry on 
foreseeability,117 the court articulated a standard of duty: 
[w]hen, because of an employee’s incapacity, an employer 
exercises control over the employee, the employer has a 
duty to take such action as a reasonably prudent employer 
under the same or similar circumstances would take to 
prevent the employee from causing an unreasonable risk 
of harm to others.118 
Accordingly, the court remanded for the jury to decide whether 
Otis acted as a reasonable and prudent employer in light of the 
surrounding facts and circumstances.119 
A vigorous dissent in Otis expressed concern that placing a 
duty on the employer for injuries involving off-duty employees 
reaches too far.120 Noting the affirmative conduct of the employer 
in Robertson, the dissenting judge found no such affirmative act 
on the part of Otis and viewed the issue as a matter of 
                                                          
employer owes no duty to Clark and motorists in general. Id. at 309. 
115 Id. at 311. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. at 311. 
119 Otis Engineering Corp. v. Clark, 668 S.W.2d 307, 311 (Tex. App. 
1983). After the employer initially won on summary judgment, the court of 
appeals reversed and remanded. Id. at 307. The employer took an appeal to 
the Texas Supreme Court. Id. The supreme court affirmed the holding of the 
court of appeals, which recognized the availability of alternative measures at 
the employer’s discretion, including a nurse station or a possible phone call to 
the employee’s wife. Id. The court also noted the obviously foreseeable 
consequences of sending its visibly intoxicated employee on the road to drive 
home. Id. 
120 Id. (McGee, J., dissenting) (stating that “the majority has placed an 
impractical and unreasonable duty upon all employers”). 
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nonfeasance because the employer failed to prevent the employee 
from driving home.121 Hence, the dissent forewarned “[i]f this 
rationale is followed, any omission will be regarded as an 
affirmative act,” thus opening the door to infinite liability.122 This 
“slippery slope” argument foresees an overly expansive scheme 
of liability and erosion of individual responsibility for one’s 
actions.123 
While the dissent presented valid concerns, the argument 
hinged on the fact that in Otis the employee, as opposed to the 
employer, created the perilous situation.124 In other words, the 
employee became intoxicated independent of any actions by the 
employer.125 Therefore, according to the dissent, liability should 
not be placed on an employer when they played no part in 
contributing to the employee’s debilitating condition.126 This 
reasoning is obviously inapplicable, however, when the employer 
is the cause of the condition. 
D. The Workers’ Compensation Parallel 
Workers’ compensation cases also provide helpful analysis of 
the question of third-party liability.127 The issue for workers’ 
                                                          
121 Id. at 315. In Robertson, the employee’s exhaustion was caused by the 
affirmative act of the employer in requiring the employee to work a grueling 
number of hours; here, such an affirmative act was not present. Id. Since the 
employer in Otis played no role in generating the employee’s incapacity, that 
is, drunkenness, Robertson was distinguishable. Id. “It is an unfair type of 
circuitous reasoning to say that [the employer] engaged in an ‘affirmative act’ 
when it ‘affirmatively’ failed to fire [the employee], or restrain him,” after 
becoming aware of his intoxication. Id. 
122 Id. The dissent concluded that, “[i]n an attempt to do justice in this 
one case, the majority has placed an impractical and unreasonable duty upon 
all employers.” Id. at 318. 
123 Id. at 319. 
124 Otis Engineering Corp. v. Clark, 668 S.W.2d 307, 308 (Tex. App. 
1983). 
125 Id. 
126 Id. at 312. 
127 For example, in Van Devander v. Heller Electric Co., the Circuit 
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Court of the District of Columbia rejected the employer’s argument that a 
compensation award should not be extended to injuries sustained while the 
employee was proceeding to or from work. 405 F.2d 1108, 1110 (D.C. Cir. 
1968). The “Coming and Going” rule excludes injuries suffered during the 
commute to and from work from workers’ compensation because that activity 
is considered outside the scope of employment. Id. However, the rule 
addresses only ordinary and routine hazards that are incident to travel. Id. The 
court distinguished the “Coming and Going” rule from “unusual hazards 
arising out of foreseeable and abnormal consequences of requiring an 
employee to remain at work for 26 hours.” Id. In essence, because falling 
asleep at the wheel was a direct result of working long hours, the accidental 
injury arose out of and in the course of employment. Id. Therefore, the court 
found a causal nexus between the employer’s excessive demands of 
employment and the employee’s injury that resulted from employment-induced 
exhaustion. Id. Accordingly, the employee was compensated because his 
“fatigue was a consequence of 26 hours of uninterrupted employment without 
rest and this was the proximate cause of his falling asleep while driving 
home.” Id. Since Van Devander, formal exceptions to the rule have evolved. 
Specifically, the Supreme Court of Missouri held that the “special hazard” 
exception provides for recovery for injuries outside the scope of employment, 
if “there is a peculiar or abnormal exposure to a peril, whose risk is incident 
to or inseparable from the scene of employment.” Snowbarger v. Tri-County 
Electrical Cooperative, 793 S.W.2d 348 (Mo. 1990). In Snowbarger, the 
employee worked eighty-six out of the 100.5 hours preceding the accident, 
which the court found constituted exposure to an abnormal peril. Id. at 350. 
Because the employee fell asleep at the wheel on the way home from work, 
the court found that his physical exhaustion was attributable to the employer’s 
working conditions. Id. The court stated that Snowbarger “encountered an 
abnormal exposure to an employment related peril because he worked eighty-
six out of the 100.5 hours preceding his fatal accident; his physical exhaustion 
engendered an unusual risk of an automobile accident . . . [t]he condition was 
incident to his employment.” Id. Therefore, the fact “that the accident 
happened after he had driven approximately twenty-two miles . . . [did] not 
change its cause: the unusually long overtime hours he had worked.” Id. 
Finally, Deland v. Hutchings Psychiatric Ctr. affirmed the decision of the 
New York State Workers’ Compensation Board that falling asleep at the wheel 
was connected to the extreme demands of employment. 203 A.D.2d 776 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1994). The employee had worked twenty-eight out of forty 
hours. Id. at 777. The court found that driving home after such an exhausting 
schedule was a reasonably anticipated hazard. Id. It further found that the long 
hours created the exhaustion which caused the accident. Id. Therefore, the 
Deland court reasoned that the excessive number of hours worked in less than 
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compensation law is whether an injury arises out of and in the 
course of employment.128 An employee’s commute is generally 
considered outside the scope of employment since the “hazards 
[employees] encounter in such journeys are not incident to the 
employer’s business.”129 However, the exception to the rule is 
premised on recognizing the causal link between hazardous or 
dangerous employment conditions and an automobile accident 
that occurs during the trip home from work.130 As such, courts 
have found that an employee’s car accident on the way home 
from work is directly caused by employment fatigue and 
sufficiently connected to employment to permit recovery.131 The 
exception requires a finding that the employment conditions were 
such that the risk of an accident of this kind was foreseeable.132 If 
so, an injury occurring outside of or away from work is brought 
back under the umbrella of workers’ compensation coverage 
because the risk of such injury never left the workplace.133 
When assessing the validity of a claim against a hospital by a 
third-party injured by an exhausted employee leaving work, the 
narrow “special hazard” exception of workers’ compensation law 
provides an analogous causal nexus between a hospitalemployer 
that overworks residents to the point of extreme fatigue and an 
accident caused by a resident who fell asleep at the wheel. This 
doctrine, customized for injuries sustained on a commute for the 
purpose of workers’ compensation coverage, provides a 
                                                          
a two day period caused the accident. Id. 
128 See Van Devander, 405 F.2d at 1110; Snowbarger, 793 S.W.2d at 
349; Deland, 203 A.D.2d at 777. 
129 Van Devander, 405 F.2d at 1110. 
130 Id. 
131 See, e.g., Van Devander, 405 F.2d at 1110; Snowbarger, 793 S.W.2d 
at 350; Deland, 203 A.D.2d at 778. 
132 See generally supra note 129 (setting forth case law illustrating this 
exception). 
133 Snowbarger v. Tri-County Electrical Cooperative, 793 S.W.2d 348, 
350 (Mo. 1990) (stating that “[a] condition may also exist where there is a 
peculiar or abnormal exposure to a peril, whose risk is incident to or 
inseparable from the scene of employment . . . [the employee’s] physical 
exhaustion engendered an unusual risk of an automobile accident”). 
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theoretical basis of causation when exhausted residents cause 
accidents after leaving work. 
E. Putting it All Together  
Case law indicates that a tiered analysis of duty and 
causation, issues that seem to inevitably merge with one another 
in intensely fact-driven cases, determines a finding of 
negligence.134 Nonetheless, foreseeability of harm, or at least 
foreseeability of a risk of harm, is a standard principle that both 
issues share.135 “Duty is measured by the scope of the risk which 
negligent conduct foreseeably entails.”136 On the other hand, 
these cases all involved egregious circumstances, not the least of 
which was an affirmative act on the part of the employer that 
played a direct causal role in the harm suffered.137 The Otis 
dissent instructively argued that because the employer did not 
commit an affirmative act, it should not be held responsible for 
harm that resulted.138 By relying on this distinguishable fact, 
however, the dissent actually left itself open to placing liability 
                                                          
134 See supra Part III.A-D (discussing third-party liability). 
135 Id. 
136 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 18.2 (1956). 
137 See generally supra Part III.A-D (setting forth case law examining 
third-party liability). Consider also that Texas courts have not extended the 
Otis holding to find employer liability. See Nat’l Convenience Stores Inc. v. 
Matherne, 987 S.W.2d 145, 151 (Tex. App. 1999) (finding that without 
“evidence of actual or constructive knowledge [that the employee] was 
incapacitated by fatigue . . . [the employer] could not have breached any duty 
to prevent [the employee] from driving”); Moore v. Times Herald Printing 
Co., 762 S.W.2d 933, 935 (Tex. App. 1998) (finding no evidence that the 
employer had knowledge of the employee’s incapacity and did not act 
affirmatively sufficient to control the employee’s actions); J & C Drilling Co. 
v. Salaiz, 866 S.W.2d 632, 639 (Tex. App. 1993) (concluding that the 
employer did not take any affirmative action to place the employee on the road 
in a fatigued state; in fact, the employer provided a trailer for rest at the work 
site). 
138 Otis Engineering v. Clark, 668 S.W.2d 307, 318 (Tex. App. 1983) 
(McGee, J., dissenting) (noting that the employer did not intoxicate the 
employee). 
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on a hospital that does create the dangerous situation—namely, 
working a resident to the point of exhaustion.139 The Otis 
dissent’s reasoning leads to the conclusion that, when an 
employer creates fatigue which causes an accident, liability 
should or could be imposed.140 
IV. ANALYSIS AND APPLICABILITY OF CASE LAW TO MEDICAL 
RESIDENTS 
An affirmative act of requiring an employee to work an 
excessive number of hours may open the door to employer 
liability.141 To establish a prima facie case of negligence, the 
defendant must have breached a duty owed to the plaintiff.142 
Although no hospital has been found liable for injuries sustained 
by a motorist involved in an accident with a fatigued resident 
who fell asleep at the wheel, the aforementioned case law 
provides encouraging signs that a claim could succeed in the 
context of medical residency programs. 
A. A Hospital’s Duty to Schedule Residents with Reasonable 
Care 
A common thread in cases discussing an employer’s liability 
to third parties is that if a risk or hazard arising out of 
employment is reasonably foreseeable, a duty is triggered on the 
part of the employer to prevent such a risk.143 As a general 
                                                          
139 Id. at 318. 
140 Id. 
141 See supra Part III (setting forth cases involving employer liability for 
third parties). 
142 See, e.g., Robertson v. LeMaster, 301 S.E.2d 563, 566 (W. Va. 
1983). The court stated, “[i]n order to establish a prima facie case of 
negligence . . . it must be shown that the defendant has been guilty of some 
act or omission in violation of a duty owed to the plaintiff. No action for 
negligence will lie without a duty broken.” Id. (citing Parsley v. General 
Motors Acceptance Corp., 280 S.E.2d 703 (W. Va. 1981)). 
143 See, e.g., Robertson, 301 S.E.2d at 568. The Robertson court was 
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proposition, if an employer affirmatively requires its employee to 
work to the point of excessive fatigue, it becomes reasonably 
foreseeable that the employee may fall asleep at the wheel after 
work and cause an accident.144 Similarly, a hospital arguably 
creates a duty to act with reasonable care when scheduling 
residents beyond set limits because of the foreseeability that an 
exhausted resident will cause an accident driving home from 
work.145 
Literature and studies by the medical community highlighting 
the inherently dangerous nature of resident physician training and 
employment methods as they pertain to operating an automobile 
also put the hospitals on notice of this problem.146 This 
information, if not produced by doctors and researchers actually 
working at or with the hospital,147 is at least available to 
employer-hospitals. Hospitals regularly schedule residents for an 
excessive number of hours, despite medical evidence that 
                                                          
confronted with the question of whether the existence of a duty is the product 
of foreseeability. Id. After examining the evidence, the court determined that 
“the [employer] could have reasonably foreseen that its exhausted 
employee . . . would pose an immediate risk of harm to other motorists.” Id. 
See also Faverty v. McDonald’s, 892 P.2d 703, 708 (Or. Ct. App. 1995). 
(stating that a defendant is “subject to the general duty to avoid conduct that 
unreasonably creates a foreseeable risk of harm to a plaintiff”). 
144 See supra Part III (discussing analogous case law). 
145 See, e.g., Gear et al., supra note 2, at 2 (questioning anesthesiology 
residents and finding a greater accident rate amongst residents than the 
national average); Lyznicki et al., supra note 10 (assessing driver sleepiness 
and highway crashes and reviewing recent recommendations to limit hours-of-
service regulations for commercial motor vehicle drivers); Marcus & 
Laughlin, supra note 10 at 766 (concluding that “an increased incidence of 
falling asleep at the wheel when driving home [after an on-call shift] probably 
result[s] in increased traffic citations and motor vehicle accidents”). 
146 See Gear et al., supra note 2; Lyznicki et al., supra note 10; Marcus 
& Laughlin, supra note 10. 
147 See Amended Complaint for Plaintiff, Brewster v. Hong, No. 98 L 
008806 (Ill. Ct. Cl. 2002). The second count of the plaintiff’s complaint points 
out, “Defendant [Hospital] operated its own Sleep Disorder and Research 
Center” and generally argues that hospitals should be aware of the problems 
associated with fatigue and motor vehicle accidents. Id. 
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“residents are 6.7 times more likely to have a motor vehicle 
accident due to falling asleep at the wheel during their residency 
than before their residency.”148 Therefore, these scheduling 
practices constitute an affirmative act triggering a duty to prevent 
the risk of motor vehicle accidents. 
In light of the hospital’s knowledge of resident fatigue and its 
detrimental effect on driving a vehicle, in conjunction with 
ever-expanding medical evidence, it is foreseeable that residents 
will fall asleep at the wheel and pose a danger to the general 
public.149 Not only is it foreseeable because overworked and 
fatigued employees are at risk of falling asleep at the wheel and 
causing accidents, but residents are especially prone to accidents 
as a result of their difficult and irregular schedules that produce 
irregular sleeping patterns.150 Since the hospital creates the 
hazardous condition, they arguably owe a duty to those who are 
at risk when a resident leaves the hospital after, for instance, a 
thirty-six hour on-call shift.151 
B. Culture of Resistance 
There is pressure placed on residents to endure long hours 
and stick by their patients, even if assigned to them towards the 
end of a shift, based upon the prevailing notion that long work 
hours breed good doctors.152 This culture is, for several reasons, 
                                                          
148 See Public Citizens Health Research Group et al., supra note 2, at 5. 
149 See, e.g., Lyznicki et al., supra note 10. 
150 See Veasey et al., supra note 13 (recognizing the impact of irregular 
sleeping patterns experienced by medical residents). 
151 Analogous case law is illustrative, see, e.g., Robertson v. LeMaster, 
301 S.E. 2d 563, 570 (W. Va. 1983); Faverty v. McDonald’s, 892 P.2d 703, 
710 (Or. Ct. App. 1995). 
152 See Marcus & Loughlin, supra note 10, at 766. “Stated reasons 
include maintaining continuity in patient care, instilling a sense of 
responsibility in residents, and increasing the learning opportunities for 
residents.” Id. See also Sarah Avery, Residents May Get Shorter Shift, NEWS 
& OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), June 22, 2002, at A1. According to Dr. John 
Weinerth, Director of Graduate Medical Education at Duke University, “[i]f 
you are only on for eight hours, is that enough time to follow a patient’s 
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resistant to work hour reform for resident physicians.153 
Residents, akin to the position of an apprentice, are dependent on 
their supervisors for positive evaluations.154 Fatigue is perceived 
                                                          
illness through to some sort of conclusion? Some illnesses are quick; some 
take a long time.” Id. This supports the school of thought that properly trained 
doctors need to get the “hands-on experience of tending to patients through the 
progression of an illness or injury.” Id. See also Sean McLinden, Editorial, 
Education, Not Ego, is Behind Medical Residents’ Long Hours, PITTSBURGH 
POST-GAZETTE, June 29, 2002, at A10. 
Learning, through observation, how a disease progresses is essential 
to acquiring the skills necessary to accurately detect and manage that 
disease in unsupervised settings. The [‘]index of suspicion,[’] the 
most valuable tool available to the physician, is most sharply honed 
through the process of caring for patients. 
Id. 
153 See Sandra G. Boodman, Waking up to the Problem of Fatigue Among 
Medical Interns, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2001 at S1. Residency work hours and 
the training in general has not changed since its inception 100 years ago. Id. 
Doctors maintain that the grueling schedules are necessary to train future 
doctors, citing the need “to subordinate needs for sleep and food to the 
unpredictable and often consuming demands of patient care.” Id. Surgeons 
insist that long hours are conducive to quality patient care because they 
“benefit patients by fostering a ‘community of care’ that forges a bond 
between doctors and patients.” Id. One Harvard-trained surgeon stated, 
“[s]urgeons are built differently. [Becoming impervious to exhaustion is] a 
part of the selection process in surgery.” Id. He was also quoted as dismissing 
complaints about fatigue as “whining.” Id.; see also David Abel, Bill Eyes 
Guidelines on Work Hours for Medical Residents, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 10, 
2001 at B1. Many hospital administrators and doctors feel that the current 
scheduling practices of residency training programs are designed to force 
young doctors to make decisions under pressure. Id. Faverty briefly touched 
on this type of environment that exists in the fast-food setting by rejecting the 
employer’s assertion that the employee “volunteered” for the overnight 
clean-up shift. Faverty v. McDonald’s, 892 P.2d 703, 710 (Or. Ct. App. 
1995). The court found that the employee did not merely volunteer for the 
shifts, but rather, that the employer affirmatively asked him to work the shifts. 
Id. The court rejected this “spin on the evidence” and recognized that the 
employer controlled such duties and penalized employees for failing to fulfill 
them. Id. 
154 Boodman, supra note 153. “Residents are a captive population afraid 
to complain—or to admit they are exhausted—because their careers depend on 
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as a weakness in medicine and residency training programs.155 
An Illinois case involving an allegation of negligence on the 
part of the hospital for a car accident caused by a fatigued 
resident provides a good example.156 According to the complaint, 
the resident in question remained at the hospital from her thirty-
third to thirty-seventh hours solely because she felt she “had to 
stay longer than just [her] usual sign-out time.”157 Narrowly 
classifying such actions as voluntary, thus constituting a separate 
causal source, ignores the prevalent feeling amongst residents 
that hospitals expect them to remain almost indefinitely at the 
hospital to care adequately for their patients.158 While the hospital 
in the Illinois case will likely argue that the resident voluntarily 
remained at the hospital, the unreasonably high expectations 
hospitals place on residents commonly create fatigue-related 
motor vehicle crashes.159 Still, a court may disagree with 
                                                          
the goodwill of their supervisors, particularly their residency directors.” Id. A 
resident’s future hinges on the recommendation received from his or her 
senior physician. Id. 
155 Id. See also Marc Siegel, Editorial, Commentary Training Rxzzzzz 
Medical Residents Need Good Supervision, Not More Sleep, L.A. TIMES, July 
1, 2002, at B11. According to Mr. Siegel, Assistant Professor of Medicine at 
New York University: 
[t]he age-old caste system for residency training is based on role 
modeling and continuity of patient care, where fledgling interns learn 
responsibility by doing rounds with their supervising residents and 
following through with their patients. It is incorrect to assume that 
sleep deprivation alone is what can lead to untoward patient 
outcomes. The greater risk lies with poorly motivated residents who 
lack adequate guidance. 
Id. 
156 See Brewster, supra note 147. 
157 Id. (emphasis added). 
158 See, e.g., Boodman, supra note 153. See also Carl T. Hall, Doctors 
See Loopholes in the Limits on Workweek, S. F. CHRON., June 16, 2002, at 
A4 (quoting a third-year resident at San Francisco General as saying, “[y]ou 
don’t talk about it[.] If you complain, you would be perceived as not being 
tough enough, or of being lazy, or not motivated to learn and do more and be 
enthusiastic. It would be seen as having a bad attitude.”). 
159 See supra Part I (discussing fatigue and residency training programs). 
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Faverty’s acknowledgment that employees feel pressure from 
management to complete shifts.160 Moreover, expectations felt by 
residents may be difficult to document and prove in court. 
On the other hand, residents are also aware of their fatigued 
conditions. Indeed, the individual resident likely knows better 
than any supervisor just how tired she feels and has the option of 
resting at the hospital or calling a taxi service or family member 
for transportation.161 Nonetheless, an independent decision to 
drive home, if it is to be classified as such, does not change the 
fact that hospitals schedule grueling hours.162 While a fatigued 
resident is at least partly responsible for his or her decision to 
drive, the hospital, as an employer, is responsible for placing the 
resident in a position to make such a decision, let alone exercise 
good judgment in a sleep-deprived condition.163 In the future, in 
recognition of these circumstances, courts may be willing to view 
the hospital and resident as joint tortfeasors and assign 
responsibility to both parties. 
                                                          
160 Faverty v. McDonald’s, 892 P.2d 703, 710 (Or. App. 1995) (stating 
that the employee “did not, out of the blue volunteer to take three shifts . . . 
[d]efendant affirmatively asked him to work those hours”). 
161 As a practical matter, whether a resident will arrange for 
transportation every time he or she feels nervous about fatigue is debatable. It 
is certainly possible that residents will ignore their exhausted bodies and drive 
home simply because they have been in the hospital for thirty-six hours and 
understandably want to get home. 
162 See, e.g., Public Citizens Health Research Group et al., supra note 2; 
see also Brewster, supra note 147. Still, an employer would seemingly have to 
know more than that the general nature of residency training is exhausting. 
Rather, a plaintiff would need to show that the employer knew of a specific 
employee’s fatigue when they left work. While an industry awareness of 
fatigue supports the conclusion that change, perhaps through legislation, is 
necessary to alleviate the problem, imposing liability on employers for 
employees who are fatigued in general likely pushes the concept of third-party 
liability past its breaking point. 
163 Robertson v. LeMaster, 301 S.E. 2d 563, 570 (W. Va. 1983) (holding 
that if the intervening cause, here, the fatigued resident, “is one to be 
reasonably anticipated, the defendant may be liable, for ‘[t]he risk created by 
the defendant may include the intervention of the foreseeable negligence of 
others’ (quoting W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS (4th ed.) (1971)). 
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C. Third-Party Liability and Residency Training Programs 
Imposing third-party liability upon hospital employers would 
produce some favorable results, but also has dangerous 
implications. On the one hand, tort liability can deter harmful 
conduct—here, the excessive scheduling of resident physicians 
that causes fatigue. On the other hand, imposing broad liability 
on health care institutions can upset their ability to provide vital 
services. 
1. Arguments in Favor of Imposing Tort Liability on Hospitals 
Tort liability is appropriate if it positively addresses and 
deters harmful conduct.164 In the medical residency context, the 
pertinent issue is whether finding a hospital liable to a motorist 
struck by a resident during the trip home from work can solve the 
fatigue-related problems of residency training. 
The fundamental philosophical premise of compensation 
supports such liability.165 If hospitals are immune from liability, 
innocent motorists struck by fatigued residents are left to absorb 
the cost of their injuries. Given the cost of medical education, 
residents are an unlikely source for large damage awards.166 
                                                          
164 See, e.g., Jennifer H. Arlen, Compensation Systems and Efficient 
Deterrence, 52 MD. L. REV. 1093, 1096 (1993) (asserting that, in a strict 
liability context, “[p]otential injurers forced to pay the full social costs of the 
risks that they create face efficient incentives to reduce risk by caretaking and 
decreasing activity frequency to the efficient levels”). 
165 Indeed, the Robertson court briefly discussed the history and aims of 
tort law before assessing the facts at hand. Robertson, 301 S.E.2d at 610. 
Desiring to promote the principle that victims of tortious conduct should be 
compensated for their losses, Robertson recognized that contemporary courts 
have abandoned the pro-defendant bias of the industrial revolution and 
furthered “the modern trend to expand the concept of duty in tort cases.” Id. 
166 For example, the average pay for residents at the University of New 
Mexico Hospital is $35,000 to $36,000. See Jackie Jadrnak, Around the Clock 
Work, ALBUQUERQUE J., Sept. 22, 2002, at A1. In another example 
illustrating the financial condition of residents during their training period, a 
heart surgeon explained that after ten years of training, he accumulated 
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Imposing liability on hospitals would compensate victims for the 
harm suffered. 
Furthermore, policy considerations suggest that imposing 
liability on hospitals for the tortious acts of residents during their 
commute is a wise choice. The basic formula in deciding whether 
any act is negligent was initially laid down by Judge Learned 
Hand in United States v. Carroll Towing Co.167 Articulating what 
is essentially an equation of cost effectiveness, reflecting the 
overall goal of American tort law, Hand stated that if the burden 
of precaution in guarding against the risk of injury outweighs the 
probability of harm together with the severity of the injury, it 
simply is not negligent to allow the possibility of injury to 
occur.168 Here, the likelihood of injury is high, as documented by 
medical studies.169 The gravity of harm resulting from all 
automobile accidents is obviously severe. Therefore, the question 
is whether it is more cost effective for hospitals to allow these 
inevitable accidents, or whether the tort regime should impose 
liability on hospitals to deter them from their current employment 
and resident training methods. Since a substantial portion of these 
accidents are preventable and result in serious injury and loss of 
                                                          
$300,000 of debt resulting in $3,000 per month loan payments. See Liz 
Kowalczyk, Heart Surgeons Suffer Long Hours, Less Pay, BOSTON GLOBE, 
June 30, 2002, at A1. 
167 159 F.2d 169 (2d. Cir. 1947). A docked barge in New York harbor 
broke away from its pier at a time when the employee responsible for the 
vessel was inexcusably absent. Id. at 173-74. The barge set off a chain 
reaction of damage to other vessels and property in the harbor, thus 
implicating a potentially wide range of liability for the owner of the barge. Id. 
at 170-71. The court formulated the cost-benefit analysis to account for the 
unpredictable and inevitable nature of accidents, such as the “occasions when 
every vessel will break from moorings.” Id. at 173. 
168 Id. 
169 See, e.g., Gear et al., supra note 2 (finding that anesthesiology 
residents experience automobile accidents at a rate twice the national average); 
Marcus & Loughlin, supra note 10 (finding that “residents frequently fall 
asleep at the wheel when driving post-call”); Veasey et al., supra note 13 
(stating that “the greatest documented danger of sleep loss for medical 
residents is the risk of motor vehicle crashes”). 
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life, the burden of precaution for the hospitals—adjusting their 
scheduling for resident physician—is a worthy change. On the 
other hand, the cost of such an adjustment, not to mention an 
unpredictable third-party liability damage award, must also be 
considered.170 
2. Arguments Against Imposing Tort Liability on Hospitals 
Imposing third-party liability on employers in general, and 
hospitals in particular, also has negative implications.171 First, 
there is the risk of expanding liability to employers in general to 
an undesirable degree. Second, there is a risk of reduced quality 
of care due to hospitals’ attempts to avoid liability. Finally, 
hospitals subject to unpredictable tort judgments could disrupt 
necessary community services. 
The potential for unlimited liability represents a glaring 
concern for imposing liability on the employer for injuries 
occurring outside the place of employment.172 Under those 
circumstances, the world becomes an employer’s plaintiff once 
the nature or demands of a job become laborious to the degree of 
                                                          
170 See supra notes 42-43 (setting forth the financial implications hospitals 
face when adjusting to work hour limits). 
171 Hospitals, unlike the general employer population, provide a vital 
service to their communities. As such, health care institutions regularly 
receive different treatment in the eyes of the law. For example, Congress 
amended the National Labor Relations Act with Health Care Amendments in 
1974, implementing additional safeguards to prevent strikes and picketing that 
could disturb patient care services. 28 U.S.C. § 158 (2003). The amendments 
mandate that a labor organization shall provide a health care institution not 
less than a ten day notice before engaging in any strike, and any employee 
who engages in a strike within the notice period shall lose his status as an 
employee. Id. 
172 See, e.g., Harrington v. Brooks Drugs, Inc., 808 A.2d 532 (N.H. 
2002). Arising out of the workers’ compensation context, the court rejected 
plaintiff’s argument that the commute after an overnight shift posed as a 
hazard, thus constituting an exception to the “going and coming” rule. Id. at 
536. The court was unprepared to “impose upon employers of overnight or 
late shift employees liability greater than that borne by employers whose 
employees work a more traditional nine-to-five schedule.” Id. 
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posing a foreseeable risk of harm to others. Establishing an 
appropriate point at which to draw such a line is difficult, if for 
no other reason than that labor, whether repairing a derailed train 
or providing patient care services, is exhausting or at least 
taxing.173 Even in light of increasing volumes of medical and 
scientific data pointing to exhausted resident physicians, it is a 
precarious proposition to impose third-party liability on an 
employer in any context, especially where the tortious act occurs 
after and outside of employment.174 
In the health care context, third-party liability could lead to a 
reduction in health care services. Hospitals provide a necessary, 
vital service to the public at large, including emergency care.175 
Imposing third-party liability could cause a reduction in quality of 
care by forcing a hospital to choose between providing 
comprehensive patient care services around the clock and sending 
residents home to ensure reasonable working hours.176 
Public regulation seemingly strikes the best balance between 
the needs of a hospital with those of the residents. Tying funding 
to compliance, as in the proposed federal regulation, can more 
effectively deter hospitals from inappropriate scheduling than the 
penalty-driven New York regulations.177 Moreover, expensive 
                                                          
173 See AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1004 (3d ed. 1992) (defining 
labor as “physical or mental exertion, especially when difficult or exhausting; 
work”). 
174 Even the aforementioned cases that did approve of third-party liability 
support this notion by virtue of their strict holdings and need for egregious 
circumstances that give rise to employer knowledge of incapacity and 
affirmative action. See supra Part III (examining analogous case law 
permitting third-party liability). 
175 Recognizing the emergency nature of hospital services and their 
necessity to the community, the PPSPA provides that the work hour 
limitations and requirements of the Act “shall not apply to a hospital during a 
state of emergency.” H.R. 3236, supra note 4, at § 3 (j)(1)(C). 
176 Even if a tort claim could successfully change residency programs to 
the extent that they reduce work hours, less work hours for residents presents 
financial challenges for the hospital as well. See supra notes 42-43 (discussing 
the economic impact of limited work hours). 
177 See supra Part II (examining the New York regulations and proposed 
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lawsuits against hospitals could lead to increased medical costs, 
shrunken patient care services or even bankruptcy of a health 
care institution.178 
CONCLUSION 
The training of resident physicians in the United States 
creates serious problems for patient care and the health of 
residents. Public regulation, though limited in some respects, 
demonstrates society’s desire to tackle this acknowledged 
problem. Enforcement is a critical component for any type of 
regulation. In this light, the PPSPA will likely operate more 
effectively than the penalty driven Bell Regulations because its 
enforcement mechanisms, conditioning federal funding and 
providing financial incentives to conform, and provision of 
additional payments from the federal government have more teeth 
than the Bell Regulations. 
In the alternative, the deterrent affect of tort law is a more 
powerful method to affect change, at the cost of potential 
financial burdens. That potential is compounded in light of the 
unpredictable nature of tort liability on hospitals and employers 
generally. Furthermore, case law illustrates the difficulty in 
deciding what constitutes unreasonable scheduling or work hours, 
an issue the Bell Regulations and PPSPA settle by implementing 
work hour limits.179 
Therefore, the PPSPA is a viable method to reduce work 
hours for residency training because such a change will save 
human life and promote medical and economic efficiency in the 
form of healthy, proficient doctors. If it cannot, an unfortunate 
motorist-turned-plaintiff may someday change the way medical 
residents are trained. 
 
                                                          
federal legislation). 
178 Even public regulation presents serious financial concerns for the 
health care industry. See supra, note 43-44 (setting forth examples of hospitals 
adjusting to work hour limits). 
179 See generally H.R. 3236, supra note 4. 
